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When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens?
Evidence from Stakeholder Reaction to
GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports
of Small Auditors
Lawrence J. Abbott, Katherine A. Gunny, and Tracey Chunqi Zhang
SUMMARY: Section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) created the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB conducts inspections of registered
public accounting firms that provide audits for publicly traded companies. The results of
the inspection process are summarized in publicly available reports at the PCAOB
website. Using these reports, we categorize the inspection reports into three levels of
increasing severity: clean, GAAS-deficient, and GAAP-deficient. We examine the
potential use of GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports as perceived audit quality
signals for the clients of GAAP-deficient auditors that are inspected on a triennial basis
by the PCAOB. Our investigation is predicated on the notion that audit quality is
generally not directly observable. Thus, the clients of these auditors may seek to signal
their desire for audit quality by dismissing their GAAP-deficient auditors. Our results
suggest that the clients of GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors are more likely
to dismiss these auditors in favor of triennially inspected auditors that are not GAAP-
deficient. In addition, we find that greater agency conflicts, the presence of an
independent and expert audit committee, and outside blockholdings magnify this effect.
Interestingly, we find no evidence that the clients use GAAP-deficient reports to procure
a subsequent-year audit fee discount or more favorable going-concern auditor reporting
treatment. Our evidence indicates that PCAOB inspection reports created heterogeneity
in auditor brand name among a group of non-Big N/non-national auditors that did not
previously exist and are universally treated by prior research as ‘‘other auditors.’’
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INTRODUCTION
I
n response to major accounting and auditing scandals such as WorldCom, Enron, and Global
Crossing, the U.S. Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX, U.S. House of
Representatives 2002). One of the more prominent aspects of SOX was the creation of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB is a private regulatory
agency, independent of the accounting industry. It was designed to oversee the auditors of public
companies, to protect the interests of investors, and further the public interest in the preparation of
informative, fair, and independent audit reports (PCAOB 2005). Congress bestowed upon the
PCAOB the ability to inspect the work of all accounting firms that audit publicly traded
companies. The results of the inspections are summarized in publicly available reports on the
PCAOB website.
Inspections are conducted annually for Big 4 and national auditors with greater than 100
publicly held registrants (annually inspected auditors).1 The inspection process is conducted
every three years for auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients (triennially inspected
auditors). The corresponding inspection reports detail a firm’s number of publicly held clients and
any inspection process findings. We classify inspection reports into three categories according to
severity. In a clean report, the PCAOB finds no audit deficiencies. In a GAAS-deficient report, the
PCAOB notes that the financial statements audited by the auditor are free of material error, but
that the audit process did not fully follow GAAS-recommended audit procedures. In a
GAAP-deficient report, the PCAOB states that the auditor ‘‘failed to identify a material departure
from GAAP’’ or that the audited company ‘‘restated certain of its financial statements to make
changes relating to’’ matters/audit deficiencies uncovered by the PCAOB inspection (PCAOB
2005).
The variation, objectivity, and accessibility of the PCAOB inspection reports suggest the
potential for stakeholder reaction to these reports via the auditor choice decision—especially for
those employing GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors.2 Since auditing helps to ensure
that financial statements are free of material misstatements and conform to GAAP, prior research
posits that external auditor-provided audit quality can reduce information asymmetries and the costs
associated with agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, since audit quality is
generally not directly observable, the market must use publicly available proxies for it (Barton
2005; DeFond 1992). As such, we examine the potential use of PCAOB inspection reports of
triennially inspected auditors as audit quality signals.
Whether PCAOB inspections improve actual audit quality and whether PCAOB inspections
provide information and/or signal value about inherently unobservable audit quality, are two
separate questions. More specifically, several papers examine the association between
outcome-based measures of audit quality and PCAOB inspection reports (DeFond and Lennox
2011; Gunny and Zhang 2012; Gramling et al. 2011; Carcello et al. 2010) and the nature of the
relation is not fully understood in terms of the severity of the report. In contrast, the current
study examines the PCAOB in the context of whether GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection
1 The Big 4 firms are Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. The national firms
are BDO Seidman, Crowe Chizek, Grant Thornton, and McGladrey LLP.
2 There is very little variation in the severity of the reports for annually inspected auditors. For example, through
2010, no annually inspected auditor received a clean PCAOB inspection report, and every Big 4 auditor received
a GAAP-deficient report. This is not to say that the inspection reports have an equivalent impact on the perception
of audit quality in the presence of large auditor size differences. Prior research has consistently noted that
marketplace participants perceive Big 4 auditors as providing higher audit quality, even though actual audit
quality is inherently unobservable. Thus, the dominant effect of the two countervailing signals (Big 4 auditor
brand name and GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports) is that the Big 4 still retain a higher perceived level
of audit quality.
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reports of triennially inspected auditors are enough of a deleterious audit-quality signal to
prompt dismissals of these auditors. Our study then identifies the successor triennially inspected
auditor and uses the three-tiered categorization scheme to denote an increase in auditor quality.
Specifically, we create a dichotomous dismissal-based dependent variable coded ‘‘1’’ in cases
where the dismissal results in a higher-quality triennially inspected successor auditor, and ‘‘0’’
otherwise.
Our auditor dismissal analysis is predicated upon the potential use of the PCAOB inspection
reports as a publicly available signal of audit quality. In particular, if the inspection reports are not
used as publicly available signals of audit quality, we should be unable to document an association
between inspection report severity and variables found in prior research to be related to auditor
switching/audit quality. Accordingly, our analysis includes agency-based variables of inside
ownership, leverage, proceeds from securities placements, and firm size (Blouin et al. 2007; Barton
2005; DeFond 1992). This is because in high agency-cost settings, clients may demand higher audit
quality to signal more credible financial reports to stakeholders and to reduce the costs associated
with agency conflicts (Hope et al. 2011).
Our analysis also incorporates governance variables of audit committee composition and the
outside blockholdings (Barton 2005; Abbott and Parker 2000). In particular, reputation and
litigation concerns may compel independent and expert audit committees to demand greater
perceived audit quality (Abbott and Parker 2000). Similarly, outside blockholders depend on the
quality of financial statements to facilitate their monitoring and may also demand greater perceived
audit quality (Barton 2005; Abbott and Parker 2000). Finally, we also control for auditor-specific
variables related to auditor switching such as opinion shopping and fee shopping (Ettredge et al.
2007; Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006). We predict that firms with high agency costs, independent and
expert audit committees, and large blockholdings are more likely to dismiss their triennially
inspected, GAAP-deficient auditors and hire a successor that is non-GAAP-deficient in an effort to
signal higher audit quality.
We find that GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors are more likely to be dismissed
by their clients and are overwhelmingly replaced by a triennially inspected successor that has not
received a GAAP-deficient inspection report. We also document that the dismissal rate for the
clean PCAOB inspection report sample is 17.9 percent, while the dismissal rate for the
GAAP-deficient sample is a significantly higher 44.3 percent. We also find that greater agency
conflicts, the presence of an independent and expert audit committee, and blockholdings magnify
the likelihood of dismissing a GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor in favor of a
triennially inspected auditor that is not GAAP-deficient. Interestingly, we find that opinion
shopping or fee shopping does not differentially impact the likelihood of dismissing a
GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor in favor of a triennially inspected auditor that is not
GAAP-deficient.
Our test setting is unique because it is purely voluntary. The auditor dismissal decision as well
as audit committee formation and composition (for the overwhelming majority of our sample firms)
is not mandated or forced. Similar to Kohlbeck et al. (2008), Blouin et al. (2007), and Barton
(2005) who study client-firm reaction to the Arthur Andersen scandal, a GAAP-deficient PCAOB
inspection report represents an exogenous, unanticipated reduction in the audit quality signal
surrounding the incumbent auditor. However, unlike these papers, the setting we are testing is
voluntary auditor dismissals. Client firms could still opt to retain their triennially inspected auditors
after the issuance of GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports.
We believe our focus on the signaling content of the PCAOB report among triennially
inspected auditors enriches our test setting in several important ways. First, clients of triennially
inspected auditors are likely to have a much more elastic response to a reduction in the audit quality
signal indicated by a PCAOB inspection report than the clients of Big 4 and national firms (Ghosh
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and Lustgarten 2006). Clients of triennially inspected auditors are smaller, which reduces
auditor-switching costs and increases the elasticity of demand for audit quality signals.3 Second,
clients of triennially inspected auditors have more flexibility with respect to audit committee
formation and composition.4 Third, our sample is comprised almost entirely of dismissals/
appointments/retentions of triennially inspected auditors, which helps to isolate the effects of the
PCAOB inspection report because auditor choice is unlikely to be influenced by auditor brand
name. Fourth, a triennially inspected auditor report will remain in the public domain for three years.
The longer lag between inspections allows clients to amortize potential switching costs over a
longer period, thus, providing additional incentive to dismiss a GAAP-deficient, triennially
inspected auditor.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide initial empirical
evidence that Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registrants found GAAP-deficient
PCAOB inspection reports to be a useful signal of audit quality for triennially inspected auditors.
Our evidence indicates that PCAOB inspection reports created heterogeneity in auditor brand name
that did not previously exist. This finding contrasts with prior research, which has treated all
triennially inspected auditors as one homogenous group known as ‘‘other.’’ Second, our paper is the
first to empirically link audit committee characteristics to PCAOB inspection report severity and
auditor choice. We believe this is an increasingly relevant finding as audit committees have been
granted much greater auditor dismissal and hiring authority due to SOX. Finally, our paper is also
the first to link the use of PCAOB inspection reports to an agency-based demand for audit quality
signals.
Our paper also provides timely evidence pertaining to recent regulatory developments
concerning the PCAOB and SEC. First, our failure to document significant stakeholder reaction to
GAAS-deficient inspection reports vis-a`-vis clean inspection reports suggests that auditors may
have been successful in downplaying the importance of these deficiencies (PCAOB 2011a).
Second, within our audit committee effectiveness composite variable, we find that audit committee
expertise is the largest, most statistically significant coefficient estimate in terms of the decision to
dismiss a GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor. This finding indicates that expertise is
critical in terms of interpreting the contents of inspection reports. Third, we note that clients did not
appear to use the GAAP-deficient inspection reports to obtain more favorable going-concern auditor
reporting treatment or audit fee discounts. The PCAOB and the inspection process have recently
seen increased political scrutiny (PCAOB 2011b, 2011c) and our findings illuminate the potential
benefits of the inspection process for triennially inspected auditors. Fourth, our evidence indicates
that the PCAOB inspection reports may be interpreted as audit quality signals—an issue with
increasing relevance as the PCAOB has recently expanded its inspection process to include the
auditors of broker-dealers (PCAOB 2011d) and considered expanding to China-based registrants
(PCAOB 2011a).
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews prior research
and discusses our hypotheses. The third section describes our research design. The fourth section
presents sample selection, results, and sensitivity analyses. The fifth section summarizes the study’s
results.
3 In contrast, the auditor dismissal decision is much less elastic for clients of annually inspected auditors, and report
severity varies little among these auditors. For example, all of the annually inspected auditors received a deficient
report throughout our sample period. However, we believe that their perceived audit quality is still high due to
auditor brand name of large auditors.
4 Virtually all of the clients of annually inspected auditors are on the three major exchanges. Thus, audit committee
formation and composition of these clients are generally not voluntary, but rather mandatory, decisions.
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PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The PCAOB Inspection Report Process
In 2002, a major regulatory shift occurred in the accounting industry. Self-monitoring,
under the AICPA, was largely replaced by external monitoring, under the PCAOB, representing
an end to more than 50 years of self-regulation in the U.S. auditing industry. Section 101 of
SOX established the PCAOB. The PCAOB has four core program areas: registration,
inspections, standard setting, and enforcement. The PCAOB devotes most of its resources to
inspections, and the inspection team is the single-largest group of employees at the agency.
Section 104 of SOX requires the PCAOB to conduct an inspection of each registered public
accounting firm that participates in the preparation of financial statements for publicly traded
companies. By law, the PCAOB annually inspects registered public accounting firms that issue
audit reports for more than 100 public companies, and it triennially inspects those that issue
audit reports for 100 or fewer public companies.
PCAOB inspections involve (1) evaluating the quality of the audit work performed on a
specific audit engagement, and (2) reviewing the auditor’s quality control system.
Engagement reviews include examining portions of selected audit engagements performed
in the prior year. The inspection team does not review every engagement; instead, inspectors
adopt a risk-based approach and select engagements and aspects of that engagement for
inspection on the basis of an internally developed risk model. If the inspection team identifies
deficiencies, it alerts the auditor to the deficiencies during the inspection. During the
inspection process, the PCAOB does not directly communicate inspection findings to the
auditors’ portfolio of clients or stakeholders (i.e., blockholders, audit committees). Any
deficiencies that exceed a significance threshold are summarized in a public portion of a
publicly available PCAOB report (although the client identity is kept confidential). Defects
related to the review of the auditor’s quality control system are discussed in the nonpublic
portion of this report and remain nonpublic unless the auditor fails to address them to the
board’s satisfaction within 12 months.
Several current studies examine the impact of the PCAOB inspection process. Gramling et
al. (2011) investigate whether PCAOB inspections results are associated with a change in audit-
firm behavior. They find that triennially inspected audit firms receiving a GAAS- or GAAP-
deficient PCAOB inspection report are more likely to issue a going-concern opinion for
financially distressed clients after the issuance of the report than before. Gunny and Zhang
(2012) examine whether PCAOB inspection results can distinguish audit quality and find
GAAP-deficient PCAOB reports are associated with lower audit quality in the form of
restatement frequency and abnormal accruals. Moreover, Gunny and Zhang (2012) document
significant variation in the severity of the PCAOB inspection reports, particularly among
triennially inspected auditors. Like Gunny and Zhang (2012), we find limited variation in the
severity of the PCAOB inspection report for the Big 4 and national auditors (i.e., no annually
inspected auditor receives a clean report, and all Big 4 auditors receive a GAAP-deficient
report).
A few papers examine the PCAOB inspection report as a signal of audit quality (Lennox
and Pittman 2010; Offermanns and Peek 2012). Lennox and Pittman (2010) examine auditors’
market share changes after the issuance of deficient PCAOB inspection reports. The results of
their auditor-level regression suggest that market share changes are insensitive to deficient
PCAOB inspection reports and indicate that the inspection reports may have been
‘‘uninformative.’’ Lennox and Pittman (2010, 96) point out that their auditor-level
methodology leads to a ‘‘parsimonious specification’’ but that ‘‘client characteristics do not
When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Stakeholder Reaction 5
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come into play.’’5 In contrast, Offerman and Peek (2012) examine the market response to
PCAOB inspection reports and find an economically significant response.
We focus exclusively on the clients of triennially inspected auditors. Overall, we believe that
our focus on these clients creates a more powerful setting to test stakeholder reaction to GAAP-
deficient inspection reports since potential switching costs are lower due to (1) smaller client size,
(2) three-year duration of the inspection report that allows clients to amortize the switching costs
over a longer time period, and (3) more competitive, atomistic auditor market in the smaller auditor
market (Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006).
Hypothesis Development
A priori, we build our hypotheses around the potential use of the most severe type of PCAOB
inspection report as an audit quality signal. We do so in order to strengthen the power of our initial
tests of the signaling potential of the PCAOB inspection reports for triennially inspected auditors.
We also perform similar tests for the clients of GAAS-deficient, triennially inspected auditors as
discussed in the ‘‘Results for the GAAS-Deficient Sample’’ section. We fashion our tests in this
manner because GAAS-deficient inspection reports may be just as deleterious an audit quality
signal as GAAP-deficient reports.6 Even though Gunny and Zhang (2012) find evidence that GAAP
deficiencies are associated with abnormal accruals (an outcome-based measure of actual audit
quality), extant research is only beginning to fully understand the nature of what the PCAOB
inspection reports reveal. As such, there is not enough empirical support to definitively state on an a
priori basis that a GAAP-deficient report is perceived to be more severe than a GAAS-deficient
report. For example, the results of Lennox and Pittman (2010) suggest that GAAS deficiencies do
not matter from a perceived audit quality perspective, whereas the results of Gramling et al. (2011)
suggest otherwise.
As our initial benchmark test, we posit that there are several reasons why stakeholders could
view a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report as a publicly available signal of audit quality and
react accordingly. First, experienced and independent personnel conduct PCAOB inspections.7
Second, a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report indicates that the auditor has failed to prevent
or detect a material GAAP misstatement by the client firm, which comports with the notion of audit
quality as defined by DeAngelo (1981). Third, consistent with the signaling literature, a signal’s
informativeness is likely to be a function of its variation. Close to 12 percent of initial PCAOB
inspection reports of triennially inspected auditors were GAAP-deficient. Fourth, PCAOB
inspection reports are easily accessible at the PCAOB website (Roybark 2006; Farrell and Shadab
2005; Carlino 2005; Victor and Levitin 2004; Spillane 2004; Aguilar and Rankin 2004). Finally,
since the PCAOB’s inspection scope is broad due to unprecedented powers of enforcement and
access to confidential documents and clients, the inspection report contains specifics about the
particular audit deficiencies. These factors suggest the potential for stakeholder reaction in the form
of the dismissal of a triennially inspected auditor that has received a GAAP-deficient inspection
report. This leads to our first hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
5 Our results and methodology are distinct from Lennox and Pittman (2010). First, our evidence suggests that a
GAAP-deficient inspection report is more likely to trigger an auditor dismissal relative to a GAAS-deficient or
clean report. Second, Lennox and Pittman (2010) leave open the empirical question of whether clients of
triennially examined auditors react differentially to GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports contingent upon
firm-specific characteristics such as agency costs, audit committee composition, and outside blockholdings.
Third, in cases when the auditor is dismissed, we identify successor auditors to determine whether, and when,
perceived audit quality has increased.
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing these issues to our attention.
7 On average, large-firm inspection teams had 23 years of experience, while the remaining inspection teams
averaged more than 14 years of experience (PCAOB 2005).
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H1: There is a positive relation between the receipt of a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection
report and the likelihood of dismissing a triennially inspected auditor in favor of a non-
GAAP-deficient auditor.
Our second hypothesis builds from agency cost theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe
how agency costs occur as a result of the separation of ownership (by the investors) and control (by
management) of the firm. When management offers a portion of the firm to investors, agency costs
arise as a result of moral hazard (Watts and Zimmerman 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976).
Managers, in turn, can mitigate these costs by voluntarily hiring independent auditors for
monitoring, thus, increasing the observability of their actions (Jensen and Meckling 1976). DeFond
(1992) notes that, within the agency relationship, two aspects create the agency problem: (1) the
divergence in preferences between management and shareholders and (2) the imperfect
observability of managerial actions. Increases in either one or both aspects dictate a greater degree
of perceived agency conflict by market participants who, in turn, impose greater agency costs on
these firms. This creates the agency-based demand for audit quality and audit quality signals
(DeFond 1992; Watts and Zimmerman 1983).
In high agency-cost settings, auditees may demand higher perceived audit quality to signal
more credible financial reports to stakeholders (Hope et al. 2011).8 We hypothesize that, as
registrants become aware of their auditor’s PCAOB inspection status, firms with greater agency
conflicts (i.e., low managerial ownership, high leverage, and size) are more likely to dismiss an
auditor that received a deficient inspection report. This leads to our second hypothesis (stated in
alternative form):
H2: Greater agency conflict values magnify the positive relation between the receipt of a
GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report and the likelihood of dismissing a triennially
inspected auditor in favor of a non-GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor.
Our third hypothesis concerns the audit committee, a key stakeholder in the auditor switch
decision. Abbott and Parker (2000) posit that reputation and litigation concerns compel independent
audit committees to demand greater perceived audit quality in the form of auditor choice, lower
nonaudit service purchases, or both (Abbott and Parker 2000; Abbott et al. 2003). However, a
necessary complement to independence is the need to understand the audit quality concept, creating
a need for audit committee financial expertise (Abbott et al. 2004). In 2002, SOX mandated
independence and financial expertise requirements for audit committees of firms whose securities
trade on one of the three major exchanges. Thus, virtually all audit committees during our sample
period should be in compliance with SOX and have independent, expert audit committees.
However, our sample is composed of the clients of triennially inspected auditors and these
companies overwhelmingly trade on the Pink Sheets or the Over the Counter Bulletin Board
(OTCBB)—neither of which have SOX-related audit committee regulations. These clients are
exempt from the SOX-related audit committee requirements but can voluntary choose to comply.
The potential variation in audit committee composition with respect to audit committee
independence and expertise leads to our third hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
H3: Independent and expert audit committees magnify the positive relation between the
receipt of a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report and the likelihood of dismissing a
triennially inspected auditor in favor of a non-GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected
auditor.
8 These audit quality signals may or may not be surrogates of actual audit quality on a client-by-client basis.
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Our fourth hypothesis concerns blockholders. Bushee and Noe (2000) note that outside
blockholders depend on the quality of audited financials to facilitate their monitoring. Accordingly,
outside blockholders may play a role in the auditor switch decision by demanding greater perceived
audit quality. Prior literature suggests that illiquidity encourages blockholders to be more active
monitors because they cannot easily exit their position (Maug 1998). Clients of triennially inspected
auditors overwhelmingly trade on the low volume Pink Sheets or OTCBB exchanges, which likely
decreases the liquidity of an outside blockholder’s ownership stake. As such, we expect the level of
outside block ownership to magnify the likelihood of dismissing a GAAP-deficient auditor. This
leads to our fourth hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
H4: Outside blockholdings magnify the positive relation between the receipt of a GAAP-
deficient PCAOB inspection report and the likelihood of dismissing a triennially
inspected auditor in favor of a non-GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor.
Our fifth hypothesis also builds from agency cost theory. Specifically, information asymmetry
creates another type of agency cost in the form of adverse selection costs when firms issue securities
(Titman and Trueman 1986; Watts and Zimmerman 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976). This also
provides an incentive to registrants to increase perceived audit quality and reduce the degree of
market discounting (Titman and Trueman 1986; Watts and Zimmerman 1983; Jensen and Meckling
1976). This leads to our final hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
H5: Securities issuances magnify the positive relation between the receipt of a GAAP-
deficient PCAOB inspection report and the likelihood of dismissing a triennially
inspected auditor in favor of a non-GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Regression Model and Variable Definitions
Consistent with prior research (Barton 2005; Carcello and Neal 2003), we use a logistic
regression framework to address our research questions. Our model is given below:
DISMISS ¼ b0 þ b1DEFRPT þ b2INOWN þ b3DEFRPTINOWN þ b4LEVERAGE
þ b5DEFRPTLEVERAGE þ b6SIZE þ b7DEFRPTSIZE þ b8ACE
þ b9DEFRPTACE þ b10BLOCK þ b11DEFRPTBLOCK þ b12FINANCE
þ b13DEFRPTFINANCE þ b14GOINGCON þ b15DEFRPTGOINGCON
þ b16FEECUT þ b17DEFRPTFEECUT þ b18FEWCLIENT
þ b19DEFRPTFEWCLIENT þ b20RESTATE þ b21DEFRPTRESTATE þ e
ð1Þ
where:
DISMISS ¼ indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ for companies that dismissed their triennially
inspected incumbent auditor and hired a non-GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected
successor within one year after the PCAOB inspection report was publicly disclosed, and
‘‘0’’ otherwise;
DEFRPT ¼ indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ for companies whose auditors received a GAAP-
deficient PCAOB inspection report upon the public dissemination of the inspection report
on the PCAOB website and ‘‘0’’ for companies whose auditors received a clean PCAOB
inspection report;
INOWN¼ cumulative percentage of voting stock shares held by managers and directors (from
proxy statements);
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LEVERAGE ¼ ratio of long-term debt to total assets (from 10-KSB, 10-K, or Compustat);
SIZE ¼ natural log of total assets in millions (from 10-KSB, 10-K, or Compustat);
ACE ¼ audit committee effectiveness variable coded ‘‘1’’ for an audit committee composed
entirely of outside directors and having at least one financial expert as designated by SOX,
and ‘‘0’’ otherwise (from proxy statements);
BLOCK ¼ cumulative ownership percentage of voting stock shares held by blockholders that
are unaffiliated with management and hold at least 5 percent of the outstanding common
shares (from proxy statements);
FINANCE¼ total cash received from equity or debt issuances for the two years after receipt of
the PCAOB inspection report, scaled by total assets. Both years in the measurement period
must be full calendar years and measurement of this variable commences during the first
full calendar year after the receipt of the PCAOB inspection report (from 10-KSB, 10-K,
or Compustat);
GOINGCON ¼ indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ in instances where firm has received a going-
concern audit report modification, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise (from 10-KSB, 10-K, or
Compustat);
FEECUT ¼ indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ for client firm receiving a fee reduction in the year
following their auditor receiving an unfavorable PCAOB inspection report , and ‘‘0’’
otherwise (from proxy statement);
FEWCLIENT ¼ indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ in instances where incumbent auditor audits
fewer than five publicly held companies, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise (from PCAOB inspection
report); and
RESTATE¼ indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ in instances where firm has experienced at least one
restatement of annual financial statements in the two-year period prior to the inspection
report date, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise (from 10-KSB, 10-K or 8-K).
The model above is designed to test the main effect of a GAAP-deficient PCAOB
inspection report on the likelihood of auditor dismissal relative to a clean PCAOB inspection
report. Our interactive terms are designed to test the incremental impact of specific stakeholders
and agency conflict on the likelihood of dismissing a triennially inspected auditor, conditional
upon the receipt of a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report. We include GOINGCON,
FEECUT, and FEWCLIENT as both stand-alone control variables and as interacted with our
DEFRPT variable.
Dependent Variable Definition
Our dependent variable, DISMISS, is an indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ for companies that
dismissed their triennially inspected incumbent auditor in favor of a non-GAAP-deficient
auditor within one year after the PCAOB inspection report was publicly disclosed, and ‘‘0’’
otherwise. If a client retains its incumbent auditor, the DISMISS variable is coded as a ‘‘0.’’ If a
client dismisses its incumbent auditor and hires a GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected
successor, this observation is also coded as a ‘‘0.’’ When calculating the DISMISS variable we
ensure the PCAOB inspection report is publicly available before the client makes the decision
to retain or dismiss the incumbent auditor.9 Appendix A provides examples of clients that
decide to dismiss their GAAP-deficient auditor once the PCAOB inspection report becomes
publicly available. Consistent with Hilary and Lennox (2005), we exclude all auditor
9 In less than 5 percent of our observations, the PCAOB report date was within 60 days of the audit report date of
the client of the triennially inspected auditor. Additional analysis suggests our results are robust to excluding
these observations (see the ‘‘Sensitivity Analysis’’ section for more details).
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resignations as these are dismissals that are not auditee initiated.10 Information concerning this
variable is obtained via inspection of forms 8-K or 10-KSB via the SEC’s EDGAR website.11
In terms of identification of successor auditors, we note that ‘‘lateral’’ switches between GAAP-
deficient auditors (i.e., switches from one GAAP-deficient auditor to another) are rare, with
only one such switch.12 In addition, if an auditor switch was undertaken, switches to either a
Big 4 or national auditor were rare, regardless of the sample. For example, only eight of the
177 switches from a GAAP-deficient auditor resulted in a Big 4 or national firm successor
auditor and only six of the 92 switches from a clean, triennially inspected auditor resulted in a
Big 4 or national firm successor auditor.13
Deficient Report Variable Definition
Our report variable, DEFRPT, is coded ‘‘1’’ for companies whose triennially inspected auditors
received a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report and ‘‘0’’ for companies whose triennially
inspected auditor received a clean inspection report. We measure this variable at the time the
PCAOB inspection report is publicly available on the PCAOB website.
Test Variables
H2 relates to agency costs and the demand for audit quality. Our agency-based variables are
derived from the two conditions giving rise to agency conflict: (1) a divergence of interests between
management and shareholders and (2) unobservability of the agent’s action. Consistent with
DeFond (1992), we use inside ownership and leverage to proxy for the first condition and client-
firm size to proxy for the second. Higher levels of insider ownership (INOWN) align the interests of
managers and owners (Copley and Douthett 2002; DeFond 1992; Jensen and Meckling 1976) and,
thus, lower agency conflicts. This, in turn, reduces the need for perceived audit quality, so we
expect that higher (lower) levels of inside ownership reduces (magnifies) the likelihood of
dismissing a GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor. Consistent with prior research (DeFond
1992), we expect higher leverage (LEVERAGE) to increase potential agency conflicts and thus
magnify the likelihood of dismissing a GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor. As firm size
grows, the unobservability of management’s actions is amplified, increasing the need for a firm to
signal higher audit quality. Consistent with prior research (DeFond 1992), we expect SIZE to
10 Unless disclosed as an auditor resignation, we assume an auditor change was client initiated. Auditor
realignments that are auditor initiated (i.e., resignation from a particular client, resignation from the PCAOB and
declining to audit publicly held clients, an auditor that is merged with another audit firm) are deleted from our
sample. Our statistical inferences are robust to including resignations in our sample.
11 There are several instances of noncompliance with 8-K disclosures due to the nature of the clients. In particular,
many client firms encapsulate their proxy information and 8-K information in their annual 10-KSB form.
Furthermore, many client firms have fewer than 500 shareholders and are not required to file such statements with
the SEC and can disclose them in their annual 10-KSB.
12 Similarly, for the GAAS-deficient sample, ‘‘lateral’’ switches after dismissal were very rare, with less than two
switches between auditors with GAAS-deficient inspection reports and only one switch from a GAAS-deficient
auditor to a GAAP-deficient auditor.
13 The mean value of our DISMISS variable for the GAAP-deficient sample is 0.443 or 168 auditor switches that
resulted in a higher-quality, non-GAAP-deficient triennially inspected auditor. The 177 total switches pertains to
the 168 switches resulting in a higher-quality (either GAAS-deficient or clean) triennially inspected auditor, 8
switches to a Big4/national auditor and one lateral switch between GAAP-deficient auditors. For the clean
sample, the mean value of our DISMISS variable is 0.179 or 84 dismissals whereby the incumbent auditor was a
clean, triennially inspected auditor and the successor auditor was either clean or GAAS-deficient. The 92 total
dismissals pertain to the aforementioned 84 dismissals and 6 dismissals that involved a switch from a clean,
triennially inspected auditor to a Big4/national auditor and 2 auditor dismissals that involved a switch from a
clean, triennially inspected auditor to a GAAP-deficient auditor.
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intensify the likelihood of dismissing a GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor. All financial
statement information is collected via Compustat, if available, or the firm’s form 10-KSB.
H3 and H4 relate to audit committees’ and blockholders’ ability to demand an increase in the
audit quality signal—whether perceived or actual. Abbott et al. (2007, 2004, 2003) find that
effective audit committees have the independence and expertise necessary to voice their concerns
over actual and perceived audit quality and influence outcomes to impact it. We define our audit
committee effectiveness variable (ACE) consistent with this line of research and SOX. Information
concerning this variable is collected from the firm’s proxy statement or 10-KSB. We expect
effective audit committees will intensify the likelihood of dismissing a GAAP-deficient, triennially
inspected auditor. We define BLOCK as the cumulative percentage of outstanding stock held by an
unaffiliated institution, and information on this variable is collected from the firm’s proxy
statement. We expect BLOCK to intensify the likelihood of dismissing a GAAP-deficient,
triennially inspected auditor.
H5 relates to the issuance of securities. We measure securities activities (FINANCE) as the
amount of proceeds raised from debt and equity issuances, scaled by total assets. As security
issuances may be sporadic and large in volume, we measure security issuances over two years, if
possible. We take the average of the total proceeds scaled by total assets for the two separate years.
In addition, the measurement period for this variable commences during the first full calendar year
succeeding the PCAOB inspection report. This is because clients use the most recently filed audited
financial statements to raise funds, so proceeds raised in the current period are based on financial
statements associated with the prior period’s auditor. If a firm decides to issue securities, it is
motivated, from this point forward, to increase perceived audit quality.14 We expect that greater
securities issuance will magnify the likelihood of dismissing a GAAP-deficient, triennially
inspected auditor.
Control Variables
In addition to our test variables, we control for other factors that prior research has found to
impact the auditor retention/dismissal decision. First, prior research has shown that ‘‘opinion
shopping’’ may be a reason to switch auditors (Ettredge et al. 2007), therefore we include
GOINGCON. Firms receiving a going-concern modification may switch auditors to obtain a more
favorable audit report during the next reporting period. We expect a positive relation between this
variable and the likelihood of dismissing auditors but do not provide an expectation on its influence
of dismissing a GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor. We also control for ‘‘fee shopping’’
by including FEECUT. Prior research has found firms often use auditor switching as a means of
procuring a reduction in their audit fees (Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006). We include FEECUT as a
main and interactive variable to determine whether retaining an incumbent auditor is negatively
associated with the decision to dismiss (i.e., main effect) or if dismissing a deficient auditor can be
used as a ‘‘reason’’ to ‘‘mask’’ the client’s attempt to lower audit fees (i.e., interactive effect).
Third, we control for the size of the auditor (FEWCLIENT). The PCAOB inspectors adopt a
risk-based approach and select engagements and aspects of that engagement for inspection based on
an internally developed risk model. The number of engagements selected for inspection usually
increases with the size of the auditor, and any deficiencies related to engagement reviews are
14 To illustrate, if a client’s auditor receives a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report on April 6, 2006, then the
client cannot change perceived audit quality when raising funds during calendar year 2006. This is because the
2005 financial statements (issued in 2006) remain the last full set of audited financial statements for the entire
calendar year 2006. However, if the client anticipates raising funds in 2007, then the perceived quality of the
auditor associated with the 2006 financial statements (most likely issued in early calendar year 2007) will matter.
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disclosed in the PCAOB inspection report but the client identity is confidential. However, if the
auditor receives a deficient PCAOB report and if the auditor only has a few public clients, the
identity of the client may be more apparent. We expect that our FEWCLIENT variable will intensify
the likelihood of dismissing a GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor. Last, we include
RESTATE to ensure our dismissal results are not driven by the presence of earnings restatements
instead of GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports (Farber 2005; Wilson 2008).
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESULTS
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
We obtain all inspection reports from the PCAOB website from January 21, 2005 to December
31, 2007. From each report, we capture the following data: auditor name, dates when the field work
was conducted, date the inspection report was publicly disclosed on the PCAOB website, number
of publicly traded clients, whether there was an audit deficiency, and whether one of the audit
deficiencies related to a failure to detect a departure from GAAP that could, if material, result in a
restatement of the financial statements. A total of 521 triennially inspected nonforeign accounting
firm PCAOB inspection reports were filed from January 21, 2005 to December 31, 2007, of which
256 (49.1 percent) were clean, and 61 (11.7 percent) were GAAP-deficient.
Of the 61 auditors that received a GAAP-deficient report, we remove four GAAP-deficient
auditors that had their registration revoked by the PCAOB (Armando Ibarra; Clyde Bailey; Kantor,
Geisler & Oppenheimer; Timothy Steers). Of the remaining 57 auditors, we can obtain clients for
54. Constructing auditor-specific client portfolios for the GAAP-deficient sample was time
consuming and labor intensive since many of the client firms are too small to be included in the
Compustat or Audit Analytics databases. Thus, to construct client portfolios, we utilized the SEC’s
extended search function. We used the auditor’s name as the search term and limited the document
search to either form 10-K or form 10-KSB. For each entry that was generated, we then examined
the 10-K or 10-KSB to confirm the auditor’s employment via the audit report. For each client, we
require financial statements, agency proxies, and audit committee variables, and we exclude clients
in the financial or utility industries.
Table 1, Panel A reports the 54 GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors included in our
sample. The 54 GAAP-deficient auditors report 525 publicly held clients per their PCAOB
inspection reports. Nonetheless, there is a significant difference between the self-reported publicly
held clients and the number of these clients that filed a 10-K or a 10-KSB with the SEC EDGAR
website. Many smaller clients with fewer than 500 shareholders are not required to file annual
statements (10-K, 10-KSB, or proxy statements) with the SEC. As a result, we can obtain complete
data for only 379 of the 525 potential client firms.
Panel C of Table 1 provides the distribution of the 379 clients of GAAP-deficient auditors by
industry as defined in Abbott and Parker (2000). The information and communication industry is
the most highly represented industry for both the GAAP-deficient and clean samples. Most
industries are well represented, with the exception of construction (SIC codes 15xx–17xx), personal
services and healthcare (SIC codes 72xx, 80xx, and 83xx) and other (SIC codes 1xx, 2xx, 7xx, 8xx,
and 99xx).
Control Sample
To determine if client firms reacted differently to the type of PCAOB inspection report, we
construct a control sample. Our control sample is comprised of clients whose auditors receive a
clean PCAOB inspection. These clients have no a priori reason to dismiss a triennially inspected
auditor receiving a clean PCAOB inspection report as a means of signaling audit quality. In
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TABLE 1
Distribution of Observations
Panel A: Distribution of Client Observations by GAAP-Deficient Auditor
GAAP-Deficient Auditor
Clients per
Inspection
Report
Sample
Clients GAAP-Deficient Auditor
Clients per
Inspection
Report
Sample
Clients
Ahearn, Jasco and Co. 3 1 Jaspers & Hall, PC 28 20
Akin, Doherty, Klein & Feuge 2 2 Johnson, Miller & Co. 3 2
Arshad M. Farooq 1 1 Kahn Boyd Levychin 8 5
Beckstead & Watts 61 37 Kyle Tingle 7 4
Bedinger & Co. 3 2 Larry E Nunn 1 1
Bernstein & Pinchuk 3 2 Lynda Keeton 1 1
Brown Smith Wallace, LLC 4 2 Mahoney Sabol & Co. 3 3
Buckno Lisicky & Co. 1 1 Mayer, Hoffman & McCann 15 12
Carter, Cartier Melby Guarino 1 1 Michael F. Cronin 8 6
Causon & Westhoff 1 1 Miller Ray & Houser 5 3
CF & Co. 5 3 Perrella & Associates 8 4
Chisholm, Bierwolf & Nilson 67 59 Peter Cosmas 2 2
Clancy & Co. 16 12 Pugh & Co. PC 5 4
Cordovano & Honeck 47 36 R.A. Fredericks & Co. 1 1
Davis Kinard & Co. 1 1 Ronald R. Chadwick 4 4
DeCoria, Maichel & Teague 8 6 S.W. Hatfield 18 14
Drakeford & Drakeford 2 2 Seligson & Giannatassio 6 5
Dudley, Hopton-Jones, Sims 1 0 Shelley International CPA 14 11
Durland & Co. 5 4 Sprouse & Anderson 11 7
E. Randall Gruber 9 9 Staples Larkin & Associates 1 0
Earl Cohen 9 5 Steakley, Gilbert & Morgan 1 1
Eisner LLP 57 34 Turner Jones & Co. 2 2
Farber, Hass, Hurley, McEwen 16 12 Turner Stone & Co. 10 8
Francis & Co. 5 3 UHY MannFrankfort 7 6
Freedman & Goldberg 3 1 Weinick, Sanders, Leventhal 7 6
Hall, Kistler & Co. LLP 1 1 Wiener, Goodman & Co. 4 2
IWA Financial Consulting 1 0 Withum, Smith & Brown 12 7
Totals 525 379
Panel B: Distribution of Client Observations by CLEAN Auditor
CLEAN Auditor
Clients per
Inspection
Report
Sample
Clients CLEAN Auditor
Clients per
Inspection
Report
Sample
Clients
Altschuler Melvoin & Glasser 23 2 LeMaster & Daniels 4 1
Anton Collins Mitchell 7 1 Levitz Zacks & Ciceric 2 2
Asher & Co. 9 2 LWBJ 1 1
Baker Newman & Noyes 12 2 Lynch & Howard 2 2
Bateman & Co. 5 1 Marc Lumer & Co. 1 1
Battelle & Battelle 4 2 Margolies Fink & Wichrowski 1 1
Beadle McBride Evans Reeves 4 3 Margolin Winer & Evans 3 2
Berkowitz Dick Pollack Brant 1 1 Margolis & Co. 3 3
BKD, LLP 77 9 Mason Russell West 2 2
Bongiovanni & Associates 9 3 Mazars 1 1
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
CLEAN Auditor
Clients per
Inspection
Report
Sample
Clients CLEAN Auditor
Clients per
Inspection
Report
Sample
Clients
Borland Benefield Crawford 1 1 McLeod & Co. 1 1
BP Audit Group 2 1 Meaden & Moore 10 2
Brady, Martz & Associates 9 1 Miller Wachman 3 3
Braverman Int. 18 3 Moore Stephens 5 5
Briggs, Bunting & Dougherty 50 7 Moore Stephens Frost PLC 6 4
Burton McCumber & Cortez 4 3 Morrison, Brown, Argiz, Farra 5 2
Cacciamatta Accountancy Corp. 6 2 Most & Co. 4 4
Carlin, Charron & Rosen LLP 24 13 Murrell, Hall, McIntosh & Co. 16 9
Carr, Riggs & Ingram LLC 6 2 Nation Smith Hermes Diamond 3 3
Carter & Co. 2 1 Nussbaum Yates & Wolpow 3 2
Carver Moquist & O’Connor 7 6 Odenberg, Ullakko, Muranishi 11 7
Cohen McCurdy 50 34 Olsen Thielen & Co. 2 1
Cole & Reed 3 1 Pannell Kerr Foster PC 1 1
Conner & Associates 16 1 Paritz & Co. 6 3
Cornick Garber & Sandler 2 1 Pender Newkirk & Co. 21 9
Coulter & Justus 5 2 Pisenti & Brinker 1 1
D’Arcangelo & Co. 2 2 PKF Witt Mares 5 4
Divine Scherzer & Brody 1 1 PKF, CPA (California) 9 4
Epstein Weber & Conover 26 20 PKF, CPA (New York) 8 6
Farmer, Fuqua & Huff 11 2 Pohl, McNabola, Berg & Co. 17 10
Ferlita Walsh & Gonzalez PA 4 3 Pustorino, Puglisi & Co. 1 1
Fitts Roberts & Co. 3 2 Raimondo Pettit Group 2 2
Fitzgerald Snyder & Co. 2 2 Ramirez International 1 1
Freed Maxick & Battaglia 12 6 Ramirez International 2 2
Freeman Buczyner & Gero 1 1 Rehmann Accounting LLC 12 4
Gelfond Hochstadt Pangburn 21 16 Reznick Group 50 8
Goff Backa Alfera & Co. 5 5 Richard L. Brown & Co. 3 2
Goldstein Lewin & Co. 5 5 Richey May & Co. 3 3
Goodman & Co. 21 5 Robert N Clemons 4 2
Gordon, Hughes & Banks 16 10 Robnett & Co. 2 1
Greenberg & Co. 3 3 Rodefer Moss & Co. 3 2
Gregory Sharer & Stuart PA 4 1 S.R. Snodgrass 18 7
Grobstein, Horwath & Co. 12 6 Schechter Dokken Kanter Andre 4 3
Gumbiner Savett Inc 4 2 Schneider & Associates 1 1
Haskell & White 19 11 Schneider Downs & Co. 6 3
Hawkins Accounting 4 3 Schoonover Boyer 1 1
Hays & Co. 10 1 Scott McElveen 4 2
Hazlett, Lewis & Bieter 3 1 S.E. Clark & Co. 2 1
Heard McElroy & Vestal 2 2 Smith Carney & Co. 2 2
Henderson Hutcherson McCullo 1 1 Sobel & Co. 3 2
Henjes, Conner & Williams 1 0 Somerset 1 1
Hobe & Lucas 2 1 Spicer Jeffries 3 2
Hogan & Slovacek 1 1 Squar, Milner, Miranda & Willi 21 7
Horowitz & Ullmann 1 1 Stegman & Co. 4 4
Horwath Velez & Co. 1 1 Stowe & Degon 3 2
Jeffrey S. Gilbert 2 2 Sweeney Gates & Co. 3 3
John Kinross-Kennedy 7 4 Swenson Advisors 5 4
Johnson Lambert & Co. 3 1 Tanner LC 19 9
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
CLEAN Auditor
Clients per
Inspection
Report
Sample
Clients CLEAN Auditor
Clients per
Inspection
Report
Sample
Clients
Joseph Decosimo & Co. 5 1 Tauber & Balser 10 6
Kaufman, Rossin & Co. 3 3 Thomas Leger & Co. 10 3
Kelly & Co. 4 4 Thomas W. Klash 2 2
Kerber Eck & Braeckel 1 1 Thompson Greenspon 1 2
Kiesling Associates 2 2 Tullius Taylor Sartain & Sartain 9 6
King & Co. 1 1 Turner, Stone & Co. 22 9
Kirkland Russ Murphy Tapp 7 5 Walden Certified Public 3 1
L. J. Soldinger 4 1 Wheeler Wasoff 6 3
Lane Gorman Trubitt 7 5 Wipfli LLP 17 2
Wolinetz, Lafazan & Co. 12 7
Totals 1,032 470
Panel C: Focus Industry Distribution for Clients of GAAP-Deficient Inspection Report Auditors
Focus Industry
Related Two-Digit
SIC Codes
Number of
Observations
Construction 15–17 7
Consumer product and food 20–33 46
Energy 10–14, 46, 49 61
Financial services 60–64, 67 37
Information and communication 48, 73, 78, 79, 84 84
Manufacturing 34–39 60
Personal services and healthcare 72, 80, 83 8
Professional, and educational services 75, 76, 82, 87, 89 17
Real estate 65, 70 20
Retail and wholesale 50–59 20
Transportation 40–42, 44, 45, 47 16
All other 1, 2, 7, 8, 99 3
Totals 379
Panel D: Focus Industry Distribution for Clients of Clean Inspection Report Auditors
Focus Industry
Related Two-Digit
SIC Codes
Number of
Observations
Construction 15–17 14
Consumer product and food 20–33 61
Energy 10–14, 46, 49 95
Financial services 60–64, 67 20
Information and communication 48, 73, 78, 79, 84 110
Manufacturing 34–39 82
Personal services and healthcare 72, 80, 83 14
Professional, and educational services 75, 76, 82, 87, 89 19
Real estate 65, 70 7
Retail and wholesale 50–59 23
Transportation 40–42, 44, 45, 47 15
All other 1, 2,7, 8, 99 10
Totals 470
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particular, should this sample exhibit similar dismissal behavior to the GAAP-deficient sample, this
could indicate an omitted, correlated variable. For the 256 auditors that received a clean report, we
can obtain clients for 135 auditors that are reported in Panel B of Table 1. Several auditors are
excluded from our clean sample because they only audit clients that (1) file 11-Ks, 20-Fs, NSAR-
Bs, and N-CSRs; (2) are in the financial or utility industries; (3) are not required to file financial
statements because they have fewer than 500 shareholders; or (4) do not have the necessary
financial statement, agency, or audit committee variables.
The 135 clean auditors audit 1,032 publicly held clients per their PCAOB inspection reports.
Similar to the GAAP-deficient sample, there is a significant difference between the self-reported
publicly held clients and the number of these clients that filed 10-Ks or 10-KSBs with the SEC
EDGAR website. Many smaller clients with less than 500 shareholders are not required to file
annual statements (either 10-K, 10-KSB, or proxy statements) with the SEC. As a result, we can
obtain complete data for only 470 of the 1,032 potential client firms. Panel D of Table 1 provides a
distribution of clients for the clean sample. The industry distribution of the clients of clean,
triennially inspected auditors largely mirrors that of the GAAP-deficient sample.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides definitions of all study variables. Panel A of Table 3 provides descriptive
statistics for the 379 clients of GAAP-deficient auditors. Several items are noteworthy. First, the
dismissal rate was high with 168 of the 379 sample firms (or 44.3 percent) dismissing auditors
within one year of the public disclosure of a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report for their
incumbent auditor. Moreover, the 379 sample firms are extremely small, with mean (median) total
assets of $10.28 million ($2.25 million). The mean (median) inside ownership was 40.09 percent
(36 percent), and less than five percent of clients audited by a GAAP-deficient auditor are traded on
any of the three major stock exchanges. As a result, 34 percent of the GAAP-deficient clients had
audit committees that met the independence and financial expertise requirements of SOX.
Somewhat in contrast to Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006), we find that a small percentage of these 379
clients received a fee reduction in the year after the PCAOB inspection report, with only 10.3
percent of sample firms receiving a fee reduction in the following year. We find that 14.5 percent of
our observations were audited by auditors having fewer than five publicly held clients and around
five percent had a restatement in the past two years.
Another striking feature of the GAAP-deficient sample, besides firm size, is the financial health
of these firms. A majority of these clients, 54.1 percent, received a going-concern modification.
Consistent with poor financial health, many of the GAAP-deficient clients needed to raise cash for
operations as evidenced by the large FINANCE variable measure. Our FINANCE variable exhibited
a mean (median) value of 0.691 (0.633). In other words, the median GAAP-deficient sample client
raised 63 percent of its total assets in subsequent debt or equity issuances. Examining the
LEVERAGE ratio suggests that the overwhelming majority of securities issuances are in the form of
equity issuances. Specifically, our median sample firm had no long-term debt as evidenced by a
median LEVERAGE value of 0.000. These results are consistent with an increase in the number of
loss firms that are publicly held.
Panel B of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the 470 clients of clean auditors. In
general, the descriptive statistics are very similar for the GAAP-deficient and clean samples. The
470 clean sample clients are also extremely small, with mean (median) total assets of $12.6 million
($3.8 million). The mean (median) inside ownership was 39.0 percent (37.0 percent), and 34.3
percent of our sample firms had audit committees that met the independence and financial expertise
requirements of SOX. The rate at which client firms received a going-concern audit opinion was
high, at 45.9 percent. As a means of comparing the two samples, we performed univariate tests for
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inter-sample differences. We document that there are only two statistically significant differences
between the two samples. The dismissal rate is lower for the clean sample, 17.9 percent versus 44.3
percent for the GAAP-deficient sample (p-value , 0.05). Clients of clean auditors are also more
likely to be audited by an auditor with fewer than five publicly held clients. In addition, we find no
statistically significant differences in industry membership across the two samples. Overall, it
appears the two samples are very similar in terms of client-specific variables and industry
membership.
Univariate Results
Panel A of Table 4 provides univariate results when the GAAP-deficient sample (n ¼ 379) is
partitioned into two groups. The partition is based on whether the client firm dismissed its GAAP-
TABLE 2
Variable Definitions
Variable Name Description
DISMISS Indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ for companies that dismissed their triennially inspected
incumbent auditor and hired a non-GAAP-deficient triennially inspected successor
within one year after the PCAOB inspection report was publicly disclosed, and ‘‘0’’
otherwise.
DEFRPT Indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ for companies whose auditors received a GAAP-deficient
PCAOB inspection report upon the public dissemination of the inspection report on
the PCAOB website and ‘‘0’’ for companies whose auditors received a clean PCAOB
inspection report.
INOWN Cumulative percentage of voting stock shares held by managers and directors (from
proxy statements).
LEVERAGE The ratio of long-term debt to total assets (from 10-KSB or Compustat).
ASSETS Total assets (from 10-KSB, 10-K, or Compustat).
ACE Audit committee effectiveness variable coded ‘‘1’’ for an audit committee composed
entirely of outside directors and having at least one financial expert as designated by
SOX, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise (from proxy statements).
BLOCK Cumulative ownership percentage of voting stock shares held by blockholders that are
unaffiliated with management and hold at least five percent of the outstanding
common shares (from proxy statements).
FINANCE Total cash received from equity or debt issuances for the two years after receipt of the
PCAOB inspection report, scaled by total assets. Both years in the measurement
period must be full calendar years and measurement of this variable commences
during the first full calendar year after the receipt of the PCAOB inspection report
(from 10-KSB, 10-K, or Compustat).
GOINGCON Indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ in instances where firm has received a going-concern audit
report modification, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise (from 10-KSB, 10-K, or Compustat).
FEECUT Indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ for client firm receiving a fee reduction in the year
following its auditor receiving an unfavorable PCAOB inspection report, and ‘‘0’’
otherwise (from proxy statement).
FEWCLIENT Indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ in instances where incumbent auditor audits fewer than
five publicly held companies, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise (from PCAOB inspection report).
RESTATE Indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ in instances where a firm has experienced at least one
restatement of annual financial statements in the two-year period prior to the
inspection report date, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise (from 10-KSB, 10-K, or 8-K).
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deficient auditor (n¼ 168) or retained its GAAP-deficient auditor (n¼ 211). Tests of differences are
reported in the last column of Table 4, Panel A. With respect to the agency costs prediction of H2,
insider ownership (INOWN) is significantly different in firms that dismissed an auditor (28.80
percent) than those that retained an incumbent auditor (49.07 percent) after the auditor received a
GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report. In terms of leverage (LEVERAGE), we do not find
univariate differences between the two subsamples. This may be a result of the small number of
firms that have debt on their balance sheets. In particular, less than 35 percent of all sample firms
had any leverage, a likely result of relying upon equity financing for survival purposes. Finally, we
document significant univariate differences in total assets (ASSETS), with firms that dismissed
auditors ($14,075,882) being larger than those that retained their GAAP-deficient, triennially
inspected auditors ($7,254,774). Panel A of Table 4 generally provides univariate support for an
agency-based demand for audit quality signals when the signal takes the form of a GAAP-deficient
PCAOB inspection report for a triennially inspected auditor.
TABLE 3
Descriptive Data
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for 379 Clients of GAAP-Deficient Inspection Report Auditors
Variable Mean Median
25th
percentile
75th
percentile
Std.
Dev.
DISMISS 0.443 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.497
INOWN (%) 40.087 36.000 17.525 59.824 29.033
LEVERAGE 0.201 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.492
ASSETS $10,278,341 $2,250,000 $1,250,000 $4,500,078 $3,079,626
ACE 0.340 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.474
BLOCK (%) 15.079 0.000 0.000 38.500 23.333
FINANCE 0.691 0.633 0.064 1.715 0.815
GOINGCON 0. 541 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.498
FEECUT 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.303
FEWCLIENT 0.145 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.352
RESTATE 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.218
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for 470 Clients of Clean Inspection Report Auditors
Variable Mean Median
25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Std.
Dev.
DISMISS 0.179 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.383
INOWN (%) 38.998 37.025 16.500 60.000 27.227
LEVERAGE 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.144 0.444
ASSETS $12,552,739 $3,750,000 $907,000 $18,750,000 $5,040,884
ACE 0.343 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.475
BLOCK (%) 15.231 0.000 0.000 40.000 24.075
FINANCE 0.679 0.672 0.080 1.866 0.945
GOINGCON 0.459 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.498
FEECUT 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.345
FEWCLIENT 0.379 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.485
RESTATE 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.129
All variables are defined in Table 2.
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Consistent with H3 and H4, we find firms with effective audit committees (ACE) and
blockholders are significantly more likely to dismiss auditors rather than to retain an auditor that has
received a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report. For the subsample of firms that dismiss their
auditors, 57.1 percent have audit committees that are compliant with SOX (i.e., comprised entirely
of independent directors and containing at least one financial expert) and mean BLOCK is 24.8
percent. In contrast, for the subsample of firms that retain their auditors, mean ACE is 15.6 percent
and mean BLOCK is 8.6 percent. These differences are significant at a p-value of less than one
percent. Our results are consistent with stakeholders (audit committee, blockholders) reacting to a
GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected PCAOB inspection report. In terms of raising financing
(FINANCE), firms that dismissed their GAAP-deficient auditors are significantly more active in the
securities market.
TABLE 4
Univariate Analysis
Panel A: Univariate Results for 379 Clients of GAAP-Deficient Auditors
Variable
Mean for Firms
where DISMISS ¼ 1
Mean for Firms
where DISMISS ¼ 0 F-statistic
INOWN (%) 28.802 49.071 12.412***
LEVERAGE 0.189 0.211 0.793
ASSETS $14,075,882 $7,254,774 7.559**
ACE 0.571 0.156 39.094***
BLOCK (%) 24.804 8.611 21.422***
FINANCE 0.823 0.584 7.454**
GOINGCON 0.506 0.569 0.756
FEECUT 0.095 0.109 1.104
FEWCLIENT 0.178 0.118 6.728**
RESTATE 0.053 0.047 0.443
No. of obs. 168 211
Panel B: Univariate Results for 470 Clients of Clean Inspection Report Auditors
Variable
Mean for Firms
where DISMISS ¼ 1
Mean for Firms
where DISMISS ¼ 0 F-statistic
INOWN (%) 39.432 37.554 0.388
LEVERAGE 0.238 0.222 0.656
ASSETS $14,375,022 $12,156,180 0.777
ACE 0.321 0.347 0.437
BLOCK (%) 15.833 15.099 0.792
FINANCE 0.668 0.695 0.424
GOINGCON 0.488 0.453 0.111
FEECUT 0.214 0.054 13.766***
FEWCLIENT 0.357 0.384 0.894
RESTATE 0.024 0.016 0.982
No. of obs. 84 386
*, **, *** Significant at p-levels of less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
All variables are defined in Table 2.
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Of the control variables, firms that retain their auditors receive more going-concern
modifications (56.9 percent) than those that switch auditors (50.6 percent); however, the
difference is not significant. We find no univariate difference between our FEECUT or RESTATE
variables within the two subsamples. Finally, for the FEWCLIENT variable, we find that firms
that dismiss their GAAP-deficient auditor are more likely to have auditors with fewer than five
clients.
Panel B of Table 4 provides univariate results when the clean sample (n ¼ 470) is
partitioned based on whether the client firm dismissed its clean auditor (n ¼ 84) or retained its
clean inspection report auditor (n ¼ 386). Tests of differences are reported in the last column
of Table 4, Panel B. With respect to the agency cost prediction of the second hypothesis,
INOWN, LEVERAGE, and ASSETS are not statistically different across the two subsamples.
With regard to the other test variables, neither blockholder presence (BLOCK) nor effective
audit committee presence (ACE), appears to explain the auditor dismiss/retain decision for the
clean sample. We also fail to document significant differences across the two subsamples for
securities issues (FINANCE), the receipt of a going-concern audit report (GOINGCON), and
whether the auditor has fewer than five clients (FEWCLIENT). The only statistically
significant difference in test variables across the two clean subsamples is for our FEECUT
variable. In particular, client firms that dismissed their clean inspection report auditors are far
more likely to receive a subsequent-year fee cut from their new auditor (0.214) than those
client firms that retained their clean inspection report auditors (0.054). In sum, the results
from Panel B of Table 4 generally do not provide support for stakeholders’ reaction to, or an
agency-based demand for, audit quality signals when the signal takes the form of a clean
PCAOB inspection report.
Multiple Regression Results
Our regression model is given in Equation (1) and our results are summarized in Table 5. As
our dependent variable is dichotomous and many of our independent variables are interactive in
nature, we utilize a logistic regression approach and calculate Z-statistics following Ai and
Norton (2003). With respect to H1, we find a significantly positive relation between DEFRPT
and DISMISS (p-value , 0.01). This finding suggests that auditors receiving a GAAP-deficient
PCAOB inspection report are more likely to be dismissed than auditors that receive a clean
report and provides multivariate support for H1.
The coefficients on the three interaction terms (b3, b5, and b7) test H2. We find a
significantly negative relation between the interaction of inside ownership with the GAAP-
deficient report variable (INOWN  DEFRPT). This suggests that lower values of inside
ownership (i.e., high agency conflict) magnify the positive relation between receiving a
GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report and the likelihood of dismissing an auditor. We do
not find any relation between LEVERAGE  DEFRPT and the likelihood of dismissal. We
document a statistically significant positive relation between the interaction of client SIZE and
DEFRPT and the likelihood of dismissing an auditor. This suggests that larger client size
magnifies the positive relation between a deficient report and the likelihood of dismissal.
While client size might be associated with greater switching costs due to an auditor’s learning
curve regarding the client, our typical firm is extremely small. Accordingly, we posit that
switching costs are likely to be very small and that the dominant effect is one of agency costs
compelling registrants of relatively larger sample firms to dismiss an auditor that receives a
GAAP-deficient report.
With respect to the audit committee (H3), our interaction variable ACE  DEFRPT is
strongly and positively related to the likelihood of dismissal. This result suggests that the
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presence of an effective audit committee magnifies the positive relation between receiving a
GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report and the likelihood of dismissal. This result suggests
that a SOX-compliant audit committee, which is designed to be one of the more important
auditor selection stakeholders in the post-SOX environment, reacts unfavorably to a GAAP-
TABLE 5
Pooled Logistic Regression Results for GAAP-Deficient and Clean Inspection Report
Auditors
DISMISS ¼ b0 þ b1DEFRPT þ b2INOWN þ b3DEFRPTINOWN þ b4LEVERAGE
þ b5DEFRPTLEVERAGE þ b6SIZE þ b7DEFRPTSIZE þ b8ACE
þ b9DEFRPTACE þ b10BLOCK þ b11DEFRPTBLOCK þ b12FINANCE
þ b13DEFRPTFINANCE þ b14GOINGCON þ b15DEFRPTGOINGCON
þ b16FEECUT þ b17DEFRPTFEECUT þ b18FEWCLIENT
þ b19DEFRPTFEWCLIENT þ b20RESTATE þ b21DEFRPTRESTATE þ e
Variable
Predicted
Sign
Parameter
Estimate Z-statistic
Intercept 0.4807 1.0882
DEFRPT þ 2.6606 3.9804***
INOWN ? 0.0053 0.9922
DEFRPT  INOWN  1.9727 3.0003***
LEVERAGE ? 1.0440 0.1022
DEFRPT  LEVERAGE  0.3655 0.8944
SIZE ? 1.0008 0.4747
DEFRPT  SIZE þ 2.3201 3.7584***
ACE ? 0.8003 0.7777
DEFRPT  ACE þ 1.7999 5.0444***
BLOCK ? 3.6622 0.7009
DEFRPT  BLOCK þ 0.4717 2.4455**
FINANCE ? 0.5995 1.0072
DEFRPT  FINANCE þ 1.0330 4.4965***
GOINGCON ? 0.8988 0.1534
DEFRPT  GOINGCON ? 0.0309 0.3777
FEECUT ? 1.7309 2.0656**
DEFRPT  FEECUT ? 0.3015 0.4933
FEWCLIENT ? 0.0726 0.8871
DEFRPT  FEWCLIENT þ 0.8082 3.3501***
RESTATE þ 0.9055 0.8664
DEFRPT  RESTATE þ 1.2292 0.3351
Obs. 849
Pseudo R2 0.3452
*, **, *** Significant at p-levels of less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The Z-statistics are calculated following
Ai and Norton (2003).
Variables are defined Table 2, with the exception of SIZE, which is the natural log of total assets.
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deficient PCAOB inspection report.15 Also, BLOCK  DEFRPT exhibits a significantly
positive association with the likelihood of dismissal. This suggests that firms subject to a high
level of external monitoring magnify the positive relation between receiving a GAAP-deficient
PCAOB inspection report and the likelihood of dismissal providing support for H4. In terms of
securities issuances (H5), we also document a statistically significant and positive relation
between DEFRPT  FINANCE and the likelihood of dismissal. This provides multivariate
support for H5.
Confirming our univariate results, we find no relation between the receipt of a going-concern
opinion or the interaction variable, GOINGCON  DEFRPT, and the likelihood of dismissal. This
result does not support the opinion-shopping argument, and prior research has shown only mixed
support for this theory. We find a positive and significant relation between subsequent-year audit
fee reductions and DISMISS, which suggests fee shopping. However, coefficient estimates for our
interaction variables, FEECUT  DEFRPT and RESTATE  DEFRPT, are not significant.
FEWCLIENT  DEFRPT exhibits a significantly positive association with the likelihood of
dismissal. This suggests that the likelihood of dismissal is higher for GAAP-deficient auditors that
audit fewer than five clients, possibly because the identity of the client may be more apparent since
the auditor has only a few clients. One of the primary criticisms of the PCAOB inspection report is
the failure to disclose the number of engagement reviews, and this finding suggests that
stakeholders could find this information useful if disclosed.
In sum, our regression results provide support for the hypothesis that clients react to GAAP-
deficient PCAOB inspection reports by dismissing the auditor at a significantly higher rate. It
appears that clients of triennially inspected auditors are using a GAAP-deficient inspection report as
a signal of audit quality. In addition, effective audit committees, blockholders, and greater agency
conflicts magnify the positive relation between receiving a GAAP-deficient report and the
likelihood of dismissal.
Results for the GAAS-Deficient Sample
In this section, we examine stakeholder reaction among clients of GAAS-deficient, triennially
inspected auditors. We conduct this additional analysis for several reasons. First, extant empirical
research is inconclusive as to whether GAAP-deficient reports are more severe than GAAS-
deficient reports (Gunny and Zhang 2012; Gramling et al. 2011; Lennox and Pittman 2010).
Second, examining stakeholder reaction to GAAS-deficient inspection reports enables us to address
the PCAOB’s recently expressed concerns pertaining to auditors’ minimization attempts
surrounding the disclosure of GAAS deficiencies (PCAOB 2012, 2011a).
In addition to the lack of extant empirical research addressing perceived differences in
inspection report severity, there are three other institutional reasons why GAAS- and GAAP-
deficient reports may have similar effects on perceived audit quality. First, the PCAOB notes that
‘‘PCAOB staff have found no direct statistical relationship between the size of an abnormal accrual
and the probability that inspections staff would detect an audit failure’’ (PCAOB 2012). Second, the
PCAOB states that all deficiencies revealed in the inspection reports are serious enough to warrant
public disclosure in the reports themselves. For example, many market participants may consider
collecting insufficient audit evidence on which to base the opinion (i.e., a GAAS-deficiency) to be a
15 We also collect data on whether the audit committee has a financial expert. FINEXP is coded ‘‘1’’ in cases where
the audit committee included a director with financial expertise, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise. Overall, it appears that if
there is an audit committee with a financial expert, it is overwhelmingly an audit committee that is already fully
independent and meeting at least four times annually. Thus, the inclusion of this variable basically reinforced our
results since very few of the non-independent audit committees included a financial expert.
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serious indictment of audit quality. Finally, one can argue that GAAS deficiencies could be more
serious because they might reflect firm-wide quality issues whereas ex post disclosure of an allowed
GAAP departure can occur even if the auditor performs a GAAS-compliant audit.16
We note that of the 521 triennially inspected PCAOB inspection reports (filed from January 21,
2005 to December 31, 2007), 204 (39.2 percent) received a GAAS-deficient report. Since the
number of PCAOB inspection reports that indicate a GAAS-deficiency far exceed the number that
received a GAAP-deficiency, we construct a matched sample of GAAS-deficient auditors. In
choosing our sample of matched GAAS-deficient auditors, we match on the total number of
publicly held clients per the PCAOB inspection reports. We did so in an effort to control for auditor
size (which is likely to be a function of the number of publicly held clients) and to generate a similar
sample size. Our GAAS-deficient sample consists of 58 auditors. We then utilize a 10-K/10-KSB
word search for each applicable GAAS-deficient auditor in a manner consistent with the technique
described in the ‘‘Sample Selection’’ section to create a roster of clients for these 58 auditors. The
resulting GAAS-deficient sample is comprised of 380 clients.
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for the 380 clients of GAAS-deficient auditors. We note
that, in contrast to the GAAP-deficient sample, there is a significantly lower client dismissal rate of
20.5 percent for firms being audited by a GAAS-deficient auditor. The rate at which clients of
GAAS-deficient auditors dismissed their incumbent auditor was very similar (and not significantly
different) to that of clients of clean inspection auditors (17.9 percent). We also find that
characteristics of clients audited by GAAS-deficient auditors are similar to clients of GAAP-
deficient and clean auditors. That is, the sample of clients audited by GAAS-deficient auditors were
also very small, risky, and with low visibility.
Our regression model using the GAAS-deficient sample as the control group is reported in
Table 7. The only difference with Table 5 is that the variable DEFRPT is coded ‘‘1’’ in instances of
a GAAP-deficient report and ‘‘0’’ in cases of a GAAS-deficient report. The results resemble those
reported in Table 5. The consistency in results suggests that our evidence is driven exclusively by
client reaction to GAAP-deficient reports. This indicates that the severity of the deficiencies was a
key determinant in the auditor dismissal decision and that registrants differentiated between the
levels of PCAOB inspection report findings—but only with respect to a GAAP-deficient inspection
report. Next, we pool the GAAS-deficient and clean auditor samples. The only difference is that our
DEFRPT is coded ‘‘1’’ in instances of a GAAS-deficient report and ‘‘0’’ in cases of a clean
inspection report. The results of this logistic regression are documented in Table 8 and reveal that
clients are not more likely to dismiss a GAAS-deficient relative to a clean report auditor.
The evidence of Tables 6–8 is consistent with Lennox and Pittman (2010) who find market
share changes are insensitive to the issuance of a GAAS-deficient report. In addition to the de-
emphasis of PCAOB inspection report findings by auditors as previously described, there are other
reasons why a GAAS-deficient inspection report may not elicit the same degree of stakeholder
reaction as a GAAP-deficient inspection report. For example, every GAAS-deficient report contains
the following statement: ‘‘the Firm did not obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support
its opinion on the issuer’s financial statements.’’ It may be that the auditor obtained enough
evidence, but failed to properly document the evidence or procedures used to obtain such evidence.
In this case, the auditor used the correct judgment in terms of the outcome (i.e., the audited financial
statements were ultimately free of material error), but failed to provide the inspection team with the
requisite amount of documentation.
Several additional factors may assist in explaining the muted response to GAAS-deficient
inspection reports. Most notably, there have been several criticisms about the PCAOB inspection
16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for providing these insights.
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report process that include the failure to disclose quality control deviations (Lennox and Pittman
2010), the focus on ‘‘form versus substance’’ (Daugherty and Tervo 2010), as well as boilerplate
verbiage concerning GAAS-deficiencies (Roybark 2006). Finally, there may be differences in
auditor judgment between the PCAOB and the auditor concerning conformance with GAAS.17 In
TABLE 6
Descriptive Data and Univariate Analysis for GAAS-Deficient Inspection Report Auditors
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for 380 Clients of GAAS-Deficient Auditors
Variable Mean Median
25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Std.
Dev.
DISMISS 0.205 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.404
INOWN (%) 38.424 33.400 16.250 57.275 24.733
LEVERAGE 0.225 0.000 0.000 0.156 0.499
ASSETS $8,108,776 $1,900,000 $1,200,000 $4,579,000 $3,113,852
ACE 0.318 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.466
BLOCK (%) 15.833 0.000 0.000 37.500 25.884
FINANCE 0.702 0.645 0.080 1.750 0.833
GOINGCON 0.634 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.482
FEECUT 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.362
FEWCLIENT 0.205 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.404
RESTATE 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125
Panel B: Univariate Results for 380 Clients of GAAS-Deficient Auditors
Variable
Mean for Firms
where DISMISS ¼ 1
Mean for Firms
where DISMISS ¼ 0 F-statistic
INOWN (%) 0.417 0.376 1.102
LEVERAGE 0.241 0.221 0.223
ASSETS $9,337,411 $7,791,446 0.794
ACE 0.295 0.324 0.179
BLOCK (%) 16.012 15.787 0.255
FINANCE 0.677 0.708 0.435
GOINGCON 0.666 0.626 0.451
FEECUT 0.218 0.139 7.899***
FEWCLIENT 0.231 0.199 0.337
RESTATE 0.026 0.013 1.016
No. of obs. 78 302
All variables are defined in Table 2.
17 To illustrate, we cite one of Ernst & Young’s GAAS deficiencies. Private conversations with two Ernst & Young
partners indicated that Ernst & Young opted to not send accounts receivable confirmations for a Cable TV
operator. Ernst & Young used an audit approach consisting of (1) a testing of and relying upon controls over the
recurring monthly invoicing/cash receipts processes, (2) utilizing alternative procedures, most notably in the form
of subsequent cash receipts, as over 98 percent of the December 31 accounts receivable balance was paid in cash
within the two months following the balance sheet date, and (3) utilizing analytical review procedures at the
account level (the partners cited extremely high monthly serial correlation between sales and subsequent cash
receipts, with little seasonality). Nonetheless, the PCAOB cited a lack of confirmatory evidence with regard to
year-end accounts receivable/revenue recognition.
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relation to this difference in opinion regarding GAAS compliance, the PCAOB has expressed
concerns pertaining to auditors’ minimization attempts surrounding the disclosure of GAAS
deficiencies—especially to corporate audit committees (PCAOB 2011a). We posit that such
minimization tactics by audit firms are less likely to be effective when attempting to de-emphasize a
GAAP-deficient inspection report vis-a`-vis a GAAS-deficient inspection report.
TABLE 7
Pooled Logistic Regression Results for GAAP-Deficient and GAAS-Deficient Samples
DISMISS ¼ b0 þ b1DEFRPT þ b2INOWN þ b3DEFRPTINOWN þ b4LEVERAGE
þ b5DEFRPTLEVERAGE þ b6SIZE þ b7DEFRPTSIZE þ b8ACE
þ b9DEFRPTACE þ b10BLOCK þ b11DEFRPTBLOCK þ b12FINANCE
þ b13DEFRPTFINANCE þ b14GOINGCON þ b15DEFRPTGOINGCON
þ b16FEECUT þ b17DEFRPTFEECUT þ b18FEWCLIENT
þ b19DEFRPTFEWCLIENT þ b20RESTATE þ b21DEFRPTRESTATE þ e
Variable
Predicted
Sign
Parameter
Estimate Z-statistic
Intercept 1.5835 0.6941
DEFRPT þ 3.3025 3.9999***
INOWN ? 0.7333 1.2229
DEFRPT  INOWN  2.3333 3.1729***
LEVERAGE ? 1.2825 0.3745
DEFRPT  LEVERAGE  0.9009 0.9329
SIZE ? 0.5315 0.8880
DEFRPT  SIZE þ 1.1654 4.0004***
ACE ? 0.0023 0.1291
DEFRPT  ACE þ 2.5382 5.4171***
BLOCK ? 2.9008 0.3715
DEFRPT  BLOCK þ 0.5884 4.2999***
FINANCE ? 0.4604 0.9333
DEFRPT  FINANCE þ 1.5501 4.0344***
GOINGCON ? 1.2488 1.3300
DEFRPT  GOINGCON ? 0.7777 0.5177
FEECUT ? 1.7511 2.4056**
DEFRPT  FEECUT ? 0.0094 0.1156
FEWCLIENT ? 1.9343 1.1002
DEFRPT  FEWCLIENT þ 0.4766 2.8222***
RESTATE þ 1.0775 0.3202
DEFRPT  RESTATE þ 0.0399 0.0575
Obs. 759
Pseudo R2 0.3112
*, **, *** Significant at p-levels of less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The Z-statistics are calculated following
Ai and Norton (2003).
All variables per Table 2 except DEFRPT, which is an indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ for companies whose auditors
received a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report upon the public dissemination of the inspection report on the
PCAOB website, and ‘‘0’’ for companies whose auditors received a GAAS-deficient PCAOB inspection report.
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Additional Descriptive Information on Successor Auditors
In this section, we examine the characteristics of successor auditors in more detail. First, we
examine the presence of restatements in the two-year period after the issuance of the PCAOB
inspection report. Although restatements are rare, we find that within the GAAP-deficient sample,
the rate of restatement is higher relative to the clean and GAAS-deficient sample. Also, the rate is
TABLE 8
Pooled Logistic Regression Results for GAAS-Deficient and Clean Samples
DISMISS ¼ b0 þ b1DEFRPT þ b2INOWN þ b3DEFRPTINOWN þ b4LEVERAGE
þ b5DEFRPTLEVERAGE þ b6SIZE þ b7DEFRPTSIZE þ b8ACE
þ b9DEFRPTACE þ b10BLOCK þ b11DEFRPTBLOCK þ b12FINANCE
þ b13DEFRPTFINANCE þ b14GOINGCON þ b15DEFRPTGOINGCON
þ b16FEECUT þ b17DEFRPTFEECUT þ b18FEWCLIENT
þ b19DEFRPTFEWCLIENT þ b20RESTATE þ b21DEFRPTRESTATE þ e
Variable
Predicted
Sign
Parameter
Estimate Z-statistic
Intercept 1.7755 1.3234
DEFRPT þ 0.9334 0.5850
INOWN ? 1.2822 0.7105
DEFRPT  INOWN  0.4545 0.3671
LEVERAGE ? 1.6501 0.8374
DEFRPT  LEVERAGE  0.3333 0.6104
SIZE ? 2.7666 1.0017
DEFRPT  SIZE þ 2.0111 1.0008
ACE ? 1.3899 0.8042
DEFRPT  ACE þ 0.6992 0.0048
BLOCK ? 2.3545 0.4999
DEFRPT  BLOCK þ 0.2393 0.7979
FINANCE ? 4.1115 1.0012
DEFRPT  FINANCE þ 0.3965 0.7177
GOINGCON ? 0.6000 0.6063
DEFRPT  GOINGCON ? 1.1310 0.5123
FEECUT ? 2.0301 4.6038***
DEFRPT  FEECUT ? 1.7888 1.2226
FEWCLIENT ? 1.0019 1.1880
DEFRPT  FEWCLIENT þ 0.4373 0.8022
RESTATE þ 0.0655 0.2330
DEFRPT  RESTATE þ 0.0424 0.3303
Obs. 850
Pseudo R2 0.056
*, **, *** Significant at p-levels of less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The Z-statistics are calculated following
Ai and Norton (2003).
All variables per Table 2 except DEFRPT, which is an indicator variable coded ‘‘1’’ for companies whose auditors
received a GAAS-deficient PCAOB inspection report upon the public dissemination of the inspection report on the
PCAOB website, and ‘‘0’’ for companies whose auditors received a clean PCAOB inspection report.
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not statistically different between clients of clean and GAAS-deficient auditors. Second, auditor
switches, in our sample, are almost always local-to-local auditors since most are small auditors that
do not have a national presence. For example, we find switches to national/Big 4 auditors are rare
with only 3.6 percent, 3.6 percent, and 3.8 percent of auditor switches from clean, GAAS-deficient,
or GAAP-deficient auditor to Big 4 auditors, respectively. In addition, 1.2 percent, 2.4 percent, and
5.1 percent of auditor switches were from clean, GAAS-deficient, or GAAP-deficient auditor to
national auditors, respectively.
Additional Sensitivity Tests
We also performed tests to determine if there were additional inspection report disclosures that
could incrementally impact stakeholder reaction to the reports. Similar to Lennox and Pittman
(2010), we included dummy variables for the following circumstances that may indicate greater
weakness severity: (1) NO_TEST if the report discloses that the audit firm failed to undertake an
evaluation, (2) INADEQUATE_TEST if the report discloses that the audit firm’s test or evaluation
was inadequate, (3) PERFORM_AND_DOCUMENT if the report includes the phrase ‘‘failed to
perform and document,’’ and (4) PERVASIVE if the report identifies a ‘‘pervasive failure to plan,
document and perform.’’ We re-ran the model in Table 5 and found that the coefficient estimates on
these variables were not statistically significant at conventional levels for any of our tests.
We also performed tests to determine if our results were sensitive to our definition of DISMISS.
More specifically, for the GAAP-deficient, clean, and GAAS-deficient samples 10, 8, and 8
observations, respectively, were switches from a triennially inspected auditor to a Big 4 or national
firm. In these cases, our DISMISS variable is coded ‘‘0.’’ Our results are robust if we delete
observations where the successor auditor was either a Big 4 or national auditor or if we re-classify
these switches as DISMISS ¼ 1.
To ensure that our results are not driven by the presence of any one auditor, we conducted our
regressions by excluding observations pertaining to one auditor at a time. The omission of sample
observations belonging to any particular GAAP-deficient or clean auditor did not qualitatively alter
our results. When auditors with just one client receive deficient PCAOB reports, the deficiency can
be attributed to the specific client with certainty. To ensure that our results are not driven by these
one-client auditors, we excluded one-client auditors from the analysis and obtained similar results.
To alleviate the concern that auditor dismissals are affected by the initial round of PCAOB
inspections instead of variables of our interest, we analyzed separately for PCAOB inspections in
year 2005, 2006, and 2007 for all three samples. We obtained results qualitatively similar to those
in Tables 5, 7, and 8 across all three years.
In terms of client characteristics, we also tested for the possibility that Section 404
requirements may have created large switching costs that, in turn, may have discouraged sample
firms from dismissing their auditors. To address this, we include a dichotomous variable coded ‘‘1’’
for client firms that had to include reports on internal controls, ‘‘0’’ otherwise. Moreover, we
included a dichotomous variable coded ‘‘1’’ in instances where the client firm disclosed a material
weakness and ‘‘0’’ otherwise.18 Inclusion of these variables did not substantively alter our results.
We measure our securities issuance variable after the issuance of a PCAOB inspection report.
Endogeneity therefore may be a concern since FINANCE may depend on the auditor dismissal
decision. Therefore, we define an alternative FINANCE variable as the difference in free cash flow
of the previous quarter and the three quarter average of capital expenditures in the year before the
18 We performed a similar test for firms that are traded on any of the three major exchanges. The inclusion of a
dichotomous variable coded ‘‘1’’ when a client firm is traded on any of the three major exchanges (and ‘‘0’’
otherwise) did not show any statistically significant relation with our dependent variable.
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PCAOB inspection report date. The results in Tables 5, 7, and 8 are robust to the alternative
specification of this variable. In addition, we perform a Hausman (1978) endogeneity test, and it
indicates that endogeneity does not materially affect our inferences. Last, in less than 5 percent of
our observations, the PCAOB report date was within 60 days of the audit report date of the client of
the triennially inspected auditor.
CONCLUSION
In an effort to restore investor confidence and trust in U.S. capital markets following major
accounting and auditing scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. We
examine the potential use of PCAOB inspection reports of triennially inspected auditors as audit
quality signals. Our examination is based upon the premise that PCAOB inspection reports may
serve as a publicly available proxy of perceived audit quality due to the independence and
experience of the PCAOB inspectors and the specificity, variation and accessibility of their reports.
We sort the inspection reports into three levels of increasing severity: clean, GAAS-deficient, and
GAAP-deficient.
We find that clients of triennially inspected auditors react differentially to the PCAOB
inspection reports contingent upon their severity. More specifically, we find that a GAAP-deficient
inspection report is more likely to trigger an auditor dismissal relative to a clean report or a
GAAS-deficient report. In addition, the subsequent auditor is virtually always a triennially
inspected auditor that is not GAAP-deficient. GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors are
dismissed at over twice the rate of either clean or GAAS-deficient auditors. Moreover, our measures
of agency conflict and audit committee effectiveness help predict which clients of GAAP-deficient,
triennially inspected auditors are more likely to dismiss their auditor. Interestingly, we note that
going-concern audit reporting and fee low-balling do not appear to be motivating dismissals of
GAAP-deficient triennially inspected auditors. The evidence provided herein suggests no
stakeholder reaction to GAAS-deficient reports vis-a`-vis clean inspection reports. This indicates
that a GAAS-deficient report is relatively uninformative to auditor choice stakeholders, consistent
with Lennox and Pittman (2010). Our results suggest that clients are using certain PCAOB
inspection reports as a publicly available signal of audit quality and not as a means of procuring
more favorable auditor reporting or audit fees.
We believe our study could be of interest to researchers, regulators, and practitioners along
several dimensions. First, our paper is the first to document that PCAOB inspection reports created
heterogeneity in auditor brand name among a group of triennially inspected audit firms that did not
previously exist. Prior research has universally treated these auditors as one homogenous group
known as ‘‘other.’’ However, we caution that this differentiation is present only for GAAP-deficient,
relative to non-GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors. Second, the muted stakeholder
reaction to GAAS-deficient inspection reports supports concerns recently voiced by PCAOB
Chairman Doty pertaining to the communication/de-emphasizing of audit deficiencies to clients and
their audit committees (PCAOB 2011a). Third, our paper is the first to empirically link audit
committee characteristics to PCAOB inspection report severity and auditor choice. We believe this
is an increasingly relevant finding as audit committees have been granted much greater auditor
dismissal/hiring authority due to SOX. Finally, we are the first to link the use of PCAOB inspection
reports to an agency-based demand for audit quality by companies that have been generally ignored
by prior research due to data availability and client size.
Overall, our results suggest that the PCAOB inspection process has created a publicly available
means of quality differentiation among triennially inspected audit firms. We acknowledge that our
population of registrants and their auditors is small relative to the overall population of publicly
traded firms. However, this focus allows us to generalize our results to an important set of auditors
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and registrants that the PCAOB has recently added or is endeavoring to add to their inspection
program. That is, our study indicates that a PCAOB inspection report may serve as an audit quality
signal for auditors of broker-dealers, who were previously exempt from the inspection process.
Such a finding has current relevance given the PCAOB has recently sought to expand the inspection
program to foreign auditors, such as those based in China whose clients are cross-listed on U.S.
security exchanges or are listed due to a reverse merger (PCAOB 2011e, 2011a). Our investigation
suggests that there is merit to the inspection process and that stakeholders can find certain types of
these reports useful. Given these current developments, we encourage future empirical research on
the costs, benefits, implications, and consequences of the PCAOB inspection process.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF TIMELINE OF PCAOB INSPECTION REPORT AND
SUBSEQUENT DISMISSAL
Example 1: Cordovano and Honeck’s client Molecular Pharmacology
January 31, 2006: Molecular Pharmacology Files 10-KSB Audited by Cordovano and
Honeck.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1191357/000122150806000006/0001221508-
06-000006-index.htm
April 6, 2006: Cordovano and Honeck’s GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Report Is
Disclosed.
http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/Documents/2006_Cordovano_and_Honeck.pdf
June 2, 2006: Molecular Pharmacology Files 8-K Dismissing Cordovano and Honeck.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1191357/000122150806000065/form8k_
06062006.htm
Example 2: Chisholm, Bierwolf & Nilson’s client Green Builders Inc.
April 14, 2005: Green Builders Inc. Files 10-KSB Audited by Chisholm, Bierwolf & Nilson.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/828189/000105050204000190/cole1203.txt
July 25, 2005: Chisholm, Bierwolf & Nilson’s GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Report Is
Disclosed.
http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/Documents/2005_Chisholm_Bierwolf.pdf
October 11, 2005: Green Builders Files 8-K Dismissing Chisholm, Bierwolf & Nilson.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/828189/000121465905001502/s1014508k.htm
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